

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W

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P R 112129Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1932

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 63

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 2137

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING MARCH 8, 1974

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THIS WEEK, TWO INFORMAL SESSIONS WERE HELD WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GROUND FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW WERE VIGOROUSLY ARGUED IN BOTH SESSIONS, AND THEY SUCCEEDED IN THEIR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF ELICITING A GENUINE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. AT THE FIRST SESSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CRITICISED THE ALLIED COMMON CEILING CONCEPT RATHER GENTLY, WHILE IN THE SECOND SESSION. THEY ARGUED AGAINST IT IN MORE EXPLICIT TERMS. CRITICISMS WERE ALSO LEVELED AGAINST THE WESTERN

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COMMON CEILING CONCEPT BY POLISH REP STRULAK

AT THE PLENARY MEETING THAT PRECEDED THE SECOND INFORMAL SESSION. IN BOTH INFORMAL SESSIONS, EASTERN REPS STRESSED THE INEQUITIES THEY SAW IN THE ALLIED PROPOSAL AND CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST ENGAGE IN FORCE REDUCTIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. IN BOTH SESSIONS, THE EASTERN SIDE FOCUSED ON DEVELOPING ITS "REVISED SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL." THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS WITH OVERALL CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE. WITHIN ITS CEILING, EACH SIDE WOULD DECIDE HOW TO DISTRIBUTE ITS REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE . END SUMMARY.

1. POLISH REP STRULAK DEVOTED HIS ENTIRE PLENARY STATEMENT OF 7 MARCH TO CRITICISING AT SOME LENGTH THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES, THE FIRST TIME THE EAST HAS DONE SO IN A PLENARY STATEMENT. STRULAK PICTURED THE COMMON CEILING AS PART OF THE ALLIED DESIGN TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES THROUGH MBFR SINCE IT WOULD PERMIT SOME WEST EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO DELAY THEIR FORCE REDUCTIONS, TO NOT REDUCE THEIR FORCES AT ALL, OR EVEN TO REPLENISH THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITIES. STRULAK CALLED UPON THE WEST EUROPEANS TO "COME OUT FROM BEHIND THE CONCEPTUAL BARRIER OF THE COMMON CEILING." HE ALSO CRITICISED THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DID NOT ENCOMPASS AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND WOULD THEREFORE NOT ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. WHEN STRULAK HAD FINISHED HIS PRESENTATION, ACTING BELGIAN REP WILLOT PRESENTED THE THIRD WESTERN STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES. THIS PROVOKED ANOTHER PROCEDURAL INTERVENTION FROM SOVIET REP KHLESTOV, MUCH ALONG THE LINES OF THE SPONTANEOUS REMARKS HE MADE AFTER THE FIRST WESTERN PRESENTATION ON STABILIZING MEASURES. KHLESTOV MAINTAINED THAT OF THE FOUR PROPOSED

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WESTERN MEASURES, ONLY THE FIRST ONE, DEALING WITH THE PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, HAD ANY CLAIM TO BEING A MEASURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE OTHER THREE WESTERN MEASURES WERE OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED UPON IN THE COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THE

PREPARATORY TALKS LAST SPRING. THE WESTERN MEASURES WERE "MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE" WHICH, WHILE WELL KNOWN IN INTERNATIONAL DELIBERATIONS, HAD NO RELATION TO TROOP REDUCTIONS. LATER, AT THE SECOND INFORMAL SESSION OF THE WEEK, WESTERN REPS OBJECTED TO KHLESTOV'S PROCEDURAL INTERVENTION. HE DEFENDED HIS POSITION AND SAID THAT MORE SUCH INTERVENTIONS COULD BE EXPECTED WHENEVER THE WEST RAISED THE TOPIC OF STABILIZING MEASURES.

3. WHILE THIS WEEK'S PLENARY SESSION WAS MORE INTERESTING THAN MOST SINCE THE START OF THIS NEGOTIATING ROUND, THE MAIN ACTION WAS IN THE TWO INFORMAL SESSIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE GROUND FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE TWO SIDES FIELDED THE SAME TEAMS FOR BOTH SESSIONS: US, FRG, AND CANADIAN REPS FOR THE WEST AND SOVIET, GDR, AND POLISH REPS FOR THE EAST. HOWEVER, EACH SESSION TOOK ON QUITE A DIFFERENT TONE. AT THE FIRST SESSION, THE EAST SEEMED TO BE MAKING AN EFFORT TO BE FORTHCOMING; AT THE SECOND, EASTERN REPS ADOPTED A MORE NEGATIVE LINE TOWARD THE WESTERN EFFORT TO GAIN EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE POSTPONED TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION.

4. DESPITE THEIR CHANGE IN TACK, EASTERN REPS STRESSED THE SAME TWO THEMES AT BOTH MEETINGS. FIRST, THEY EMPHASIZED THE INEQUITY OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL. THEY CLAIMED THAT PROPOSED US-SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE ARE MANIFESTLY UNFAIR SINCE SOVIET TROOPS MAKE UP A  
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SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER PROPORTION OF PACT FORCES THAN US TROOPS DO OF NATO FORCES. SECOND, EASTERN REPS STRESSED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST TAKE PART IN FORCE REDUCTIONS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. IN THE FIRST INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF THE "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" BETWEEN PHASES, WHICH WAS PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME. BUT BY THE SECOND SESSION, THEY WERE SAYING THAT THE ALLIED CLARIFICATIONS REGARDING LINKAGE WERE ONLY A PLEDGE TO START NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SECOND REDUCTION PHASE AND GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHERE AND TO WHAT EXTENT INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPEAN STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. AS SUCH, THE "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" WAS SIMPLY ANOTHER OF THE

VAGUE AND NON-COMMITTAL ALLIED STATEMENTS ABOUT  
THE CHARACTER OF PHASE II.

5. IN THE FIRST INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS  
MADE ONLY MILD CRITICISMS OF THE ALLIED COMMON

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P R 112129Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1933

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 64

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 2137

FROM US REP MBFR

CEILING CONCEPT. POLISH REP STRULAK SEEMED TO  
BE HINTING THAT IF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES COULD BE  
INCLUDED UNDERSUCH A CEILING, THE EAST MIGHT  
TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF IT. AT THE SECOND  
INFORMAL SESSION, HOWEVER, EASTERN REPS ARGUED  
AGAINST THE COMMON CEILING MORE DIRECTLY,  
REPRESENTING IT AS AN EXTENSION OF THE ALLIED  
THEORY OF DISPARITIES AND AS SUCH UNACCEPTABLE.  
EASTERN REPS SAID THE COMMON CEILING HAD TWO MAIN  
DEFECTS IN THEIR VIEW. FIRST, IT COVERED ONLY

GROUND FORCES. SECOND, IT WOULD OFFER THE ALLIES TOO FREE A HAND IN DECIDING PROPORTIONS OF NATIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD SOME DIFFICULTY ANSWERING ALLIED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EQUITY OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN GENERAL, AS WELL AS ON SECRET

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PHASING. WHILE THEY REFUSED TO AGREE EXPLICITLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS, THEY CLEARLY SEEMED TO BE THINKING IN THOSE TERMS. THIS WAS EVIDENT IN THEIR SUGGESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A FORCE FREEZE BETWEEN PHASES AS WELL AS IN THEIR "REVISED SYMBOLIC PROPOSAL."

6. THAT PROPOSAL, A VARIATION OF THE FIRST STAGE CONTEMPLATED IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER 8, WAS OUTLINED BRIEFLY IN THE FIRST INFORMAL SESSION THIS WEEK AND DEVELOPED MORE FULLY IN THE SECOND. IT IS AT PRESENT ONLY BEING OFFERED TENTATIVELY, AND MUCH OF IT IS STILL UNDEFINED. IT PROVIDES FOR SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST STAGE WITH SEPARATE OVERALL CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE. WITHIN ITS CEILING, EACH SIDE COULD DIBIBUTE NATIONAL REDUCTIONS AT ITS OWN DISCRETION, BUT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE. THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A LIMITED TIME, PERHAPS A YEAR, AND NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE DURING THAT PERIOD. THE EAST HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE QUITE SMALL, PERHAPS CONSISTING OF AS LITTLE AS ONE PERCENT OF THE FORCES ON EACH SIDE. EASTERN REPS HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT A PROVISION MIGHT BE INCLUDED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BASIS OF REDUCTIONS USED IN THE SYMBOLIC STAGE DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE.

7. AT THE FIRST INFORMAL SESSION, KHLESTOVALSO FLOATED THE IDEA THAT THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS COULD BE REDUCED IN A FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE THE FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REMARKS ON THIS SUGGESTION AT THE SECOND INFORMAL SESSION APPEARED TO CONFIRM WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD SUSPECTED, THAT THE IDEA WAS PUT FORWARD FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARGUMENT AND WILL PROBABLY NOT BE DEVELOPED FURTHER.

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8. ASSESSMENT: IT IS TOO EARLY TO DRAW A FIRM CONCLUSION AS TO PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE THREE INFORMAL SESSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD THUS FAR. THESE SESSIONS DO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR SYSTEMATIC INFORMAL DISCUSSION WHICH HAS BEEN WHOLLY LACKING AND HAVE TO THAT EXTENT PROVED THEMSELVES. EACH SIDE IS ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO SOUND OUT THE OTHER ON A NUMBER OF POINTS AND WILL USE A VARIETY OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS TO DO SO. LAST WEEK'S TOPIC--GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS-- WAS ONE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF WHICH EASTERN REPS COULD STRIDENTLY ARGUE AGAINST THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, AND THIS WEEK'S TOPIC, UNDER WHICH THE EAST WILL RAISE AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, WILL BRING NEGATIVE WESTERN CRITICISM. IN GENERAL, THE EASTERN SIDE THIS WEEK CONTINUED TO SHOW THE IMPORTANCE IT PLACES ON THE INFORMAL SESSIONS. THE EAST CONTINUED TO CONFORM CLOSELY TO THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT FOR THE SESSIONS, TALKING ONLY ABOUT GROUND FORCES. THE PRIMARY EASTERN ATTEMPT OF THE WEEK TO SOUND OUT THE WEST WAS EMBODIED IN KHESTOV'S SUGGESTION OF THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION VARIANT. ALTHOUGH ENTAILING SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN OTHER REGARDS, THE AGGREGATE CEILING ASPECT OF THAT PROPOSAL COULD, IF IT CAN BE SEPARATED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE PROPOSAL, HAVE SOME USE IN MEETING ALLIED OBJECTIONS TO NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS. THE TACIT EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF PHASED NEGOTIATIONS WAS ALSO A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. THE CONTINUED INDIRECT ALLUSIONS BY EASTERN REPS TO A FORCE FREEZE BETWEEN PHASES RAISES A QUESTION WHICH SHOULD BE EXAMINED FURTHER. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 MAR 1974  
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**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE  
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